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## *Chinese Affairs*

State Department review completed

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18 September 1973

## *Chinese Affairs*

This publication was prepared by the China branches of the East Asia - Pacific Division of the Office of Current Intelligence, with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the individual articles.

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## Maligning Moscow

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Peking is broadening its propaganda attack on the Soviet Union. In the last two weeks, NCNA has either originated or replayed articles extremely critical of Soviet policy in virtually every part of the world. In all of these attacks, Moscow is portrayed as pursuing a policy of detente while in fact it is building up its military capabilities and seeking world hegemony.

-On 1 September, NCNA approvingly quoted Secretary of Defense Schlesinger's statements: "the existence of detente has not affected Soviet behavior at all," and "Moscow sees no conflict between an atmosphere of detente and improving their active forces."

-On 5 September, NCNA accused Moscow of "expansionist moves" in the Persian Gulf aimed at gaining control of this "highly strategic area" and its vast oil reserves.

-On 7 September, NCNA quoted Western news reports that Moscow is stepping up naval and air activities in the Caribbean and that this has caused "uneasiness" in Washington. NCNA also repeated its charge that Moscow still refused to sign the protocol on the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America.

On 9 September an NCNA "correspondent" denounced the "Brezhnev clique" for trumpeting the "myth of detente" in world affairs, while going all out in the arms race and developing multiple independently targeted missile warheads.

-Also on 9 September, NCNA denounced Moscow for renewing its efforts to revive the concept of an Asian collective security arrangement. NCNA charged that this was in reality an effort to fill the void left by withdrawing US forces from Asia. The article cited expanding Soviet naval forces in the Indian Ocean, the South China Sea, and the Cambodian port of Kompong Som.

During this same period, articles critical of the Brezhnev-Nixon summit have also appeared, but the emphasis has been on Soviet rather than US perfidy. One article criticized Moscow for using the Soviet-US agreement on the prevention of nuclear war to proclaim the successes of its "peace diplomacy," while continuing its "nuclear intimidation and blackmail against the people of various countries"; another replayed a caustic anti-Soviet article by a Japanese leftist journal; a third cited the annual world defense survey of the London International Institute for

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Strategic Studies to assert that despite the disarmament "promises" of both superpowers, arms competition between Moscow and Washington is continuing unabated.

Taken together, these articles both reflect and reinforce Chou En-lai's analysis of the Sino-Soviet-US triangular relationship. In his report to the Tenth Party Congress, Chou criticized both superpowers, but labeled Moscow as China's chief enemy. He said that while "temporary collusion" was possible between the superpowers, it was certain to be eclipsed by continuing global "competition." Chou's statements also probably reflect Chinese concern that the Nixon-Brezhnev summit may have strengthened Moscow's hand and emboldened the Soviets to launch their latest propaganda campaign against Peking. China, while almost certainly worried about the Soviet military threat, is also strongly interested in countering Moscow's efforts to portray itself as a power intent on detente and disarmament.

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## Pleasing Pyongyang

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Last week Peking lavished considerable attention on the 25th anniversary of the North Korean regime. A friendship delegation headed by Central Committee Vice Chairman Li Te-sheng traveled to Pyongyang and was received by Kim Il-sung. Chou En-lai and three of the four other vice chairmen attended a reception at the Korean Embassy, and *Peoples Daily* ran a long editorial extending China's "warmest congratulations and loftiest salute" to the North Koreans. The editorial, as well as a speech given by Li Te-sheng in Pyongyang, reiterated Peking's support for Kim Il-sung's program for the reunification of the peninsula and included a general call for the withdrawal of US troops and a denunciation of a "two-Koreas" approach.

A display of good will is not unusual for Peking on the special anniversaries of its oldest ally in Asia, but the broad high-level attention paid to the event this year suggests that Peking is making special efforts to shore up its relationship with the North Koreans at a time when China is coming under increasing propaganda attack from the USSR. As late as early summer, North Korean leaders were expressing discontent over their relations with Peking and were praising Moscow. Peking is obviously trying to tilt the balance back toward China. Just prior to the anniversary, Peking had scored points by roundly criticizing Moscow for inviting South Korea to participate in the World University Games.

The Chinese are also out in front of the Soviets in advancing North Korea's interests at the UN. In New York last week, Chinese Ambassador Huang Hua emphasized Peking's support of the Algerian resolution on the Korean question in private talks with US Ambassador Scali. China, as it did last year, is co-sponsoring the resolution. This year's document for the first time specifically calls for terminating of the United Nations Command. Huang said that both UNCURK and the UN Command are "stumbling blocks" to the unification of Korea and implied that UN membership for both Koreas would lead to the perpetual division of the peninsula, a position that is identical to that of North Korea. Huang rejected the US view that a UN presence was needed to enforce the armistice in Korea and predicted that "wide controversies" would arise when both the Algerian and the US resolutions on the subject were placed before the UN General Assembly. After an initial round of lobbying last year on behalf of the Algerian resolution, the Chinese accepted the negative decision of the General Assembly without making a major issue of its differences with the US on the question. This year the Chinese probably feel compelled to press somewhat harder, although they will no doubt stop short of any all-out confrontation.

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## The Subcontinent

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With Chinese policy taking on an increasingly anti-Soviet cast, Peking apparently has decided to forgo any early normalization of relations with India and Bangladesh, despite the Indo-Pakistani settlement. Chinese diplomats have indicated that normal ties with Dacca now depend on the repatriation of all Pakistani prisoners--including the 195 singled out for trial. Resolution of this issue seems at least months away. China's chief UN delegate Huang Hua indicated to his US counterpart last week that Peking would prefer to avoid another embarrassing veto of Dacca's bid for UN membership, but he clearly implied that China would vote nay unless the prisoner exchange were completed.

Delhi's treaty ties with Moscow have intensified China's coolness toward India.

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[REDACTED] An article in the Chinese press asserted that Moscow has inherited Britain's colonial mantle in India. Sino-Indian relations have been further aggravated by a planned European trip by the Dalai Lama. The Chinese have formally protested to Delhi and have asked several European countries to refuse visas.

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Peking clearly views its policy in the context of competition with the Soviets for regional influence and seems prepared to risk damage to its lesser interests. In his conversation with the US envoy, Huang Hua said he thought the situation would become more tense as the Soviets sought to expand their power southward into the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean to compete with the US for the area's strategic resources, primarily oil.

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## Assessing Algiers

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Following the ancient Chinese maxim of "doing nothing that everything might be done," Peking adopted a low posture at the recently concluded nonaligned summit meeting in Algiers. Chou En-lai's greetings to the meeting, which contained the by-now standard line on resisting domination of the world by the big powers, was the only official Chinese statement at the affair. Much of Peking's work, however, was done by others. Many of the speakers at the conference adopted the Chinese thesis that Soviet imperialism is on a par with that of the United States and that Third World nations should resist the efforts of the superpowers to achieve hegemony.

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Peking media gave heavy coverage to the conference, selectively quoting those speakers who supported an independent role for Third World countries or opposed the superpowers on various issues. The Chinese let several incidents speak for themselves. For example, they had no comment on Brezhnev's letter protesting the lumping of the USSR and the US together as hegemonistic superpowers, Castro's similar defense of Moscow, and Libyan President Qadhafi's anti-Soviet rejoinder. By this tactic, China appears to have gained some political ground vis-a-vis the USSR among the nonaligned nations.

The heavy publicity given the conference underlines the importance Peking attaches to its pursuit of political support against the USSR throughout the non-aligned world. Chou En-lai remarked to the Tenth Party Congress that the awakening of the Third World was a major development in contemporary international life. An NCNA article published on the opening day of the Algiers conference, echoing Chou's remarks of last August, criticized both the USSR and the US. But Moscow was characterized as a menacing, expansionist power, while the US was described as a declining power.

Peking must be gratified at the progress it made at the conference in tarnishing the image of the USSR, but the Chinese almost certainly realize that the nonaligned world is still a collection of individual countries with no unity of goals and with no recognized leadership. The Third World was not even able to agree on permanent machinery to attend to its interests. Since it lacks the strength of either of the two superpowers, Peking seeks political ties and support wherever it can find them.

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## Peking on Indochina

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Peking is still treating Vietnam developments with great restraint, limiting its comments to expressions of Chinese support for the Vietnamese Communists in the context of post-war economic and political reconstruction. China marked North Vietnam's National Day on 1 September more quietly than at any time during the war years. It was Yeh Chien-ying who led the Chinese delegation to the DRV Embassy reception in Peking, not Chou En-lai, who had attended every year since 1964. Brief toasts rather than lengthy speeches were exchanged, and Peking's pledges of support at the reception and in the congratulatory message signed by the Chinese leadership were subdued and were confined to civilian enterprises.

China's priorities and outlook toward Vietnam were clearly reflected in its handling of the Chinese aid shipment to the PRG in northern South Vietnam on 1 September. The Chinese have gone to some length to stress that the shipment was for civilian, not military, uses and therefore consistent with Peking's position that the war has ended and economic reconstruction started.

Chinese restraint also was apparent during recent stopovers in Peking by North Vietnamese party leader Le Duan and Premier Pham Van Dong. NCNA did not go into any details about Le Duan's meeting with Chou En-lai in late August, and its description of Chou's meeting with Dong in mid-August was perfunctory. The North Vietnamese accounts also were less enthusiastic than usual, suggesting the two sides encountered several areas of disagreement, almost certainly including Chinese military aid.

It has been clear for some time that Peking and Hanoi differ over the composition and level of assistance that the Chinese should dispatch southward. North Vietnam obviously wants more military aid than China is willing to send. For example, Hanoi publicized an account of a ceremony in Canton in which the North Vietnamese ambassador decorated Chinese individuals and units involved in transporting military aid to North Vietnam during the war; the Chinese press has not mentioned the ceremony.

Peking has also maintained a low profile with respect to the situation in Cambodia. Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei offered Peking's first authoritative endorsement of the major statement by Sihanouk's exile government in mid-August, but it came in a routine way during the DRV National Day reception. Chou En-lai barely mentioned Cambodia in his political report to China's party congress. While continuing to replay major statements of the Cambodian insurgents, Peking recently has heavily edited out criticism of the US and references to Thai and South Vietnamese support for Phnom Penh. NCNA did broadcast a lengthy article on current developments in Cambodia on 6 September, but it apparently was primarily intended as an anti-Soviet polemic and offered no insights into Peking's current thinking on the Cambodian situation.


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## Submarine Cable Purchases From Japan

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Japan has emerged as the leading contender for China's potentially lucrative market for submarine telephone communications cable. After nearly two years of intensive negotiations with the Chinese and spirited competition with other non-Communist suppliers, a consortium of Japanese companies has recently announced winning orders from China to supply underwater coaxial cable systems for both international and domestic communications. Two of the orders, which Japanese officials say are firm, total nearly \$25 million—a \$20 million project for installing an international coaxial cable system between Japan and China, and a 400-kilometer submarine cable system costing nearly \$5 million which reportedly will be installed between the Chinese ports of Tang-ku and Lu-shun. The Japanese expect to receive additional contracts for submarine cable systems and two or more cable-laying ships. The total value could exceed \$50 million.

China's recent decision to go ahead with the project to build a high-capacity submarine cable between the two countries has been a major victory for Japan. The Japanese attach considerable importance to being the first country to establish submarine cable communications with China. The plan initially was proposed in late 1971 by the International Telegraph and Telephone Company Limited (KDD), a private firm which owns and operates Japan's international telecommunications facilities. The Japan-China cable system, which is expected to be in operation by mid-1976, will have a capacity of 480 telephone circuits. The system is expected to link Shanghai and Nagasaki, although several other Japanese cities are vying for the honor of being the terminal site for the cable.



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The Japanese principals who were awarded the international submarine cable contract are expected to be the key suppliers of submarine cable for China's domestic use as well. In early June, the Chinese concluded an agreement with Asahi Boeki, Fujitsu Limited, Japan Ocean Submarine Cable Company, and C. Itok Company for the supply of equipment and materials for constructing a submarine

cable between what the Japanese presumed would be Tientsin and Luta. According to the agreement, China will send technicians to Japan for training by Fujitsu and Japan Ocean Submarine Cable Company. Upon completion of the training, these technicians will supervise the actual laying of the cable.

## Annex

## A Further Look at the New Central Committee

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
The Tenth Central Committee, elected in August 1973, is the largest Central Committee ever elected in the history of the party. As Central Committees have continually grown in size from one party congress to the next, they have become more representative, involving youth, women, workers, peasants, and other groups that reflect the general composition of the party. Since the Cultural Revolution the majority of seats has shifted from national to provincial officials.

This expansion of the Central Committee has tended to decrease its effectiveness as a policy-making body. The large numbers and the increasing representation from the provinces have made the convening of a Central Committee plenum a cumbersome and time-consuming operation. The Eighth Central Committee, for example, held 12 plenary sessions in its 12-year existence (10 of them during the first six years). That committee had fewer than 200 members, the majority of whom were national officials residing in Peking. The Ninth Central Committee, a larger group with most of its members residing in the provinces, held only two plenums in its four years. The new Central Committee, larger still, with 319 members (minus one who died after the congress) and with roughly the same proportion of members living outside of Peking, will probably have to rely, as did its predecessor, on working sessions that include only the most important members of the committee.

The new Central Committee has more of everything except soldiers. In absolute numbers, there are more national figures, more provincial representatives, more workers, peasants, women, young people, ethnic minorities, and more government officials--but fewer military men. Still the composition of the new committee has not drastically changed from its predecessor except in military representation. Members of national stature, for example, still make up about a third of the new committee, and representatives of mass organizations rose only slightly to approximately 12 percent. Civilian officials from the provinces, however, hold a larger proportion of seats, continuing the gain made by this group in the Ninth Central Committee. Provincial civilian officials, most of whom were only alternate members, rose from a meager one fifth of the Eighth Central Committee to 27 percent of the Ninth committee, and are now about 30 percent of the Tenth.

In other respects, the composition of the new committee does not point to a continuation of trends evident in 1969, but a partial return to the norms of the Eighth committee. Civilian government officials at the national level, who made up 29 percent of the Eighth Central Committee, dropped to ten percent of the Ninth, but climbed back to 13 percent of the new group, including eight government

## Composition of the 10<sup>th</sup> Central Committee (319 members)









\*Rehabilitated cadre are officials who were on the 8<sup>th</sup> Central Committee, but not on the 9<sup>th</sup>.

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## Chinese Communist Party Central Committees

Military & Civilians

National & Provincial



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ministers. The same kind of partial recovery holds true for national party officials, mainly by reducing the number of national military figures and adding new civilian party and government officials who have never been on a Central Committee before.

These adjustments reflect the party's decision to restore an appropriate balance between military men and civilians and are a further attempt to make the top party leadership more like the group chosen at the Eighth Party Congress. Military representation has been reduced in every sense. But the total number and the percentage of military men has dropped; the percentage of purely military men who hold no civilian posts has declined; the proportion of military men from the provinces - tiny on the Eighth committee, much larger on the Ninth - is down; central military leaders, who made up more than half of the national figures on the Ninth Central Committee, have been cut back sharply. Of the 75 military holdovers from the Ninth committee, 25 were alternate members and were therefore in line for promotion to full membership on the Tenth committee; only two of the 25 were promoted. Although the national government gained several seats on the new committee, none of the new seats was given to those government ministers who are military men.


Twenty-seven military men were added to the new committee, but close to 50 were dropped. Most of them fell either well before or as a result of the Lin Biao affair. Most of the others are figures engaged in strictly military duties with no civilian assignments. Three military men on the Ninth Central Committee subsequently lost their civilian posts, although retaining their military positions. All three were dropped from the committee.

#### ...And from the Provinces


Earlier this year national party leaders established quotas for military and civilian representatives to the Tenth Party Congress. One result is that provincial representation on the new Central Committee does not reflect the actual military/civilian balance of power in the provinces. The over-representation of provincial-based civilians at the expense of their military compatriots continues a trend noted earlier this year - the steady erosion of military influence on provincial party committees through the addition of civilians. [redacted] Indeed, national party leaders apparently used the same technique in filling the Tenth Central Committee.

The absolute number of provincial military figures on the Ninth and Tenth central committees is roughly equal. But the addition of three times as many provincial civilians as provincial military men has substantially decreased the total percentage of provincial military men on the Tenth Central Committee. This apparent effort to reduce the military's influence is also evident in other ways:

### Provincial Military & Civilians On the 10<sup>th</sup> Chinese Communist Party Central Committee\*



### Provincial Military & Civilians On the 9<sup>th</sup> Chinese Communist Party Central Committee\*




\* (Approximate percentages)

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# **New & Old Provincial Figures On the 10<sup>th</sup> Chinese Communist Party Central Committee**

(Approximate percentages)



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- Only one provincial military man was promoted from alternate to full membership, although 17 were eligible; 14 civilians were promoted.
- There were 57 additions to the Tenth Central Committee from the provinces, but only 14 were military officers, half the number required to represent the military's actual power on provincial party committees.
- Military men who currently hold positions in the provinces normally occupied by civilians fared better in all respects than those who have only military responsibilities. This parallels the practice at the center already noted.

The few provincial military officers who were on the Ninth Central Committee, but were not elected to the Tenth, were dropped primarily for political reasons. Most were deeply implicated in the Lin Biao affair of September 1971; a number disappeared because of various other political indiscretions.

The manner in which the provincial seats on the new central committee were filled suggests that a further but gradual effort to reduce the military's role in provincial politics can be expected. This process, however, will be a selective one; all military men do not think alike, and politics obviously played a central part in determining those who were dropped from the new committee.

Provincial civilian representation on the Tenth Central Committee is dominated by holdover members from the Ninth. Most of these individuals gained prominence during and after the Cultural Revolution. Eight former provincial bosses, who were purged during the Cultural Revolution and lost their seats on the Ninth, regained them on the Tenth. Only one of the eight, however, currently holds a provincial position. To date, the other seven have only appeared in Peking, and their former provincial jobs are firmly in the hands of others. It is not yet clear what their role will be, but should the seven again gain party posts in the provinces, they will probably be well below their former positions.

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## Chronology

3 September	Peking formally protests New Delhi's permission for trip by the Dalai Lama to Europe. [REDACTED]	25X1
4 September	Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping receives visiting British parliamentarian Roy Jenkins. [REDACTED]	25X1
5 September	Prince Gholam Reza Pahlavi of Iran arrives in Peking for tour of China. [REDACTED]	25X1
6 September	Asian - African - Latin American table tennis tournament concludes in Peking with large leadership turnout. [REDACTED]	25X1
	Chou En-lai receives visiting Romanian delegation. [REDACTED]	25X1
8 September	Chinese media hail 25th anniversary of the founding of the North Korean regime. [REDACTED]	25X1
	Minister of Commerce Kolokassidhis leaves Cyprus for China to sign first Sino-Cypriot trade agreement. [REDACTED]	25X1
10 September	Friendship delegation headed by Vice Chairman Li Te-sheng travels to North Korea; is received by Kim Il-sung. [REDACTED]	25X1
11 September	French President Pompidou arrives in Peking. [REDACTED]	25X1
12 September	Mao meets with President Pompidou of France. NCNA reports that Pompidou and Chou En-lai were greeted at Mao's residence by Wang Hung-wen. [REDACTED]	25X1 25X1
	Philadelphia Orchestra arrives in Peking for tour of China. [REDACTED]	
14 September	Chadian economic mission visits Peking to sign economic cooperation agreements. [REDACTED]	25X1
15 September	Upper Volta announces diplomatic recognition of PRC, the 87th nation to do so. The Nationalist government on Taiwan is recognized by 37 nations. [REDACTED]	25X1
16 September	Chiao Kuan-hua leaves Peking for New York to head PRC delegation to UN General Assembly. [REDACTED]	25X1

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